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General Comments
This paper by Peter Dungan, Tony Fang and Morley Gunderson, which was supported by
grants from Metropolis and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, uses
the FOCUS macroeconomic model of the University of Toronto to estimate the impact of
a 100,000 per year increase in immigration over a ten-year period starting in 2012. The
methodology relies on microeconomic information, much of which is dated, from earlier
studies of the impact of immigration in Canada and other countries to gauge the
microeconomic impact that is used to shock the various exogenous variables and
equations of the model.
As is often the case in such studies, the model overrides are the most important
determinants of the simulation results as most, if not all, the important impacts of
immigration are not built into the structure of the model. And this key fact will, of course,
be ignored by those who will use the results to make the case for higher immigration.
In this case in particular, it is assumed that all the new immigrants will find employment
to the same degree as other Canadians, but at a wage reflecting the substantial discount
reported in the 2006 Census. This is based in part on the assumption that the Canadian
economy will be operating at a high level of employment over the 2012 to 2022 period of
the simulations which can be characterized as full employment. This, of course, is an
optimistic assumption. Indeed, it is likely that the unemployment rate of new immigrants
will be much higher than other Canadians as has been reported by the Census and Labour
Force Survey (approaching twice as high for recent immigrants). And it is also a risk that
other Canadians could face higher than full employment levels of unemployment if some
of the risks facing Canada and the international economy as a result of international fiscal
and trade imbalances materialize. But this is another story.
In addition, many possible model overrides, such as allowing for lower propensities to
consume, purchase new housing, and import, which might dampen the magnitude of the
demand impacts of the simulations, are not taken into consideration. There is also the
possibility that lower wages resulting from increased immigration would cause the
substitution of labour for capital and mitigate the increase in investment spending in the
simulation resulting from the accelerator effect of increased aggregate demand.
Nevertheless, the overall simulation results still show the increase in real GDP (2.29 per
cent) being less than the increase in population resulting from immigration (2.59 per cent)
or the increase in employment (2.82 per cent). This means that the additional immigration
actually causes a small reduction in labour productivity. And it certainly doesn’t suggest
2that there will be much additional output resulting from the immigration left over for
other Canadians.
The key fiscal result of the simulation that Canada would have $14 billion in additional
net government revenues from the impact of the assumed increase in immigration is
highly questionable. It depends on the combined effect of the assumptions explained
below, namely that recent immigrants in the labour force will have the same
unemployment rate, that their taxes will be the same with respect to income and spending
and that the government will spend less on real current and capital spending on them than
on other Canadians. It also depends on the overall macro impacts on GDP. None of these
assumptions are very plausible.
The more likely scenario is that the new immigrants do not experience anything
approaching full employment and that governments end up spending more than assumed
to provide them with the same level of services as other Canadians and to meet their
special needs resulting from their likely high levels of poverty. And it is also likely that
the positive impact on GDP and tax bases will not be as large as estimated for the reasons
explained below.
The best way to estimate the net fiscal impact of additional immigration is to focus on its
direct effect as Herb Grubel and I do in our joint paper (Grubel and Grady, 2011). Adding
in alleged macroeconomic fiscal benefits based on dubious assumptions as is done in the
FOCUS paper just muddies the waters.
The most unlikely scenario of all is the alternative scenario presented in the paper where
the new immigrants also earn the same amount as other Canadians. It is this scenario that
generates the $22 billion increase in net fiscal revenues noted in the paper.
A problem with such simulation results as those produced with the FOCUS model that
support the case for more immigration is that they will be used by pro-immigration
groups to prove that Canada needs more immigrants. The mystique attached to
prestigious academic institutions and complicated econometric models that are beyond
the understanding of even most educated people will enhance the credibility of arguments
that fly in the face of simple Census data on the performance of recent immigrants and
indeed on a common sense understanding of the economic forces at play when more
underperforming immigrants are admitted to a modern welfare state like Canada.
Some Specific Observations
The section surveying the literature is interesting, particularly the part that discusses the
theoretically expected impact. It starts out with a good presentation of the possible
negative impact of immigration on the wages and employment prospects of non-
immigrants relying on the economic theory of supply and demand as applied to labour
markets (p.3). But its discussion of the possible positive impacts such as on consumer
3spending and housing, industrial structure, trade, is weaker and less soundly based on
microeconomic theory (p.4).
The survey of the literature leads the authors to conclude that the overall result on the
labour market for other Canadians is small (p.6). While they mention the study by
Aydemir and Borjas (2006) which finds a negative effect over the period 1971-2001, they
tend to dismiss it in favour of earlier studies which found no effects. This ignores the fact
that the increase in immigration particularly from the Third World is a relatively recent
phenomena that was not fully captured in the earlier studies.
On p.7, they note that “Overall, the Canadian evidence suggests that new immigrants tend
to access transfer programs like unemployment insurance, social assistance and housing
subsidies less than do domestic-born persons.” But it should be emphasised that the
evidence presented mostly concerns pre-1990 immigrants and excludes the recent cohorts
of immigrants who have fared much more poorly in the labour market.
Also the literature survey does not cover immigrants’ consumer behaviour or demand for
housing. This is an important gap as their FOCUS model estimates of the impact of
increases in immigration very much depend on the assumption that new immigrants will
for any given income level spend the same amount as other Canadians on these
categories. Equations for consumer expenditure (and also housing demand) are usually in
real per capita terms and have some form of real per capita permanent income as
important driving variables (I can only speculate here as the exact equations are not
presented in the paper and my documentation on FOCUS is out of date). So increases in
population from whatever source tend to increase demand. While it’s true that this is
dampened by the assumption that the new immigrants will earn less than other
Canadians, the permanent income variable may be overstated because it assumes that past
per capita income was the same for the immigrants as for other Canadians. And it doesn’t
consider the possibility that new immigrants will need to save a larger share of their
income than other Canadians in order to get themselves financially established in Canada.
Also it doesn’t allow for the possibility that new immigrants may double up on housing
with others and thus not generate the same demand for housing as other Canadians all
other things being equal (this assumption could be easily checked in the Census as it has
data on housing conditions). Another issue is the impact of immigration on exports and
imports. It is possible that the marginal propensity to import could be higher for new
immigrants who may prefer the goods they are familiar with from their home countries.
This would have a mitigating impact on any increase in aggregate demand resulting from
additional immigration. On the other hand, exports to their home countries could be
increased if the new immigrants were to get involved in export-oriented businesses.
On p.10 they conclude that “Overall, the evidence for Canada suggests that immigration
is likely to have a positive effect on government fiscal balances although that impact is
not likely to be sufficient to be a panacea for the looming pension and especially health
care expenditures associated with an ageing population. As a more conservative
statement it is the case that immigrants are very unlikely to be a net drain on fiscal
balances.” Yet the only Canadian evidence they cite is Akbari (1989a, 1989b 1991, 1995)
4which again use data from the late 1980 or 1990 before the recent increase in immigration
particularly from the Third World. Herbert Grubel’s study (Grubel, 2005) of the net
fiscal impact of recent immigration is not mentioned in the paper.
As they say on p.12 “The purpose of the remainder of this paper is to follow the spirit of
those suggestions [from their microeconomic literature survey] by providing illustrative
evidence of the impact of immigration on the Canadian economy through simulations
based on the FOCUS model.” In other words, the FOCUS simulations do not actually
provide any independent estimates of the microeconomic effects of immigration, but
merely illustrate the macroeconomic consequences given the assumption that the impact
of immigration induced population increases is the same as any other source and their
interpretation of the microeconomic literature, which in so far as it provides any evidence
on Canada at all largely predates the post 1990 large increase in immigration.
Note that the base case assumes that the Canadian economy will close most of the gap
opened up in the 2008-09 recession by 2012 and will be operating at “full employment”
by 2015. This means that the impact of immigration is being estimated assuming that the
immigrants will be arriving in an economy operating with relatively tight labour markets.
It is far from obvious that this will be the case given the severity of the past recession and
the risks overhanging the domestic and international economic outlooks.
The shock considered is a ten-year increase of 100,000 net immigrants per year adding up
to a total of 1 million immigrants assuming no return immigration. This shock was
chosen because it increases immigration levels to roughly 1 per cent of population, which
is the level advocated by Liberal then Citizenship and Immigration Minister Elinor
Kaplan and more recently re-iterated by the former Liberal Official Opposition Critic for
Youth, Citizenship and Immigration, Justin Trudeau.
A question that needs to be asked given the recent deterioration in the performance of
immigrants is whether it would be possible to find this many new prospective immigrants
without a further deterioration in the their “quality.” This problem would exacerbated by
the Government’s perceived requirement that it must clear the backlog in taking new
immigrants. This would mean that at least initially many of the additional immigrants
would come from the backlog. And, of course, it is a fact of life that the new immigrants
would not necessarily be all selected as skilled workers as currently only 17.5 per cent
are. Many of the new immigrants would be immediate family of skilled workers, family
class including some parents and grandparents, and maybe even refugees as the
immigration of all categories of immigrants seems to expand when the totals do.
Interestingly on p.13 they say “While the results could be considered ‘linear’ for an
increase of perhaps up to 100,000, or even a decrease of say 30,000, any larger changes
in immigration in either direction would likely require further research into important
additional effects – for example, the absorptive capacity of the economy for a large
increase, or the impact of key labour-shortage bottlenecks for significant decreases in
immigration from current levels.” As they acknowledge that their base level is only set at
approximately 0.75% of population, rising from 260,700 in 2012 to 291,800 in 2021 and
5that they have not considered the any impact from the Temporary Foreign Worker
Program, they have not allowed much room for increases from current levels except that
which would result from return migration.
A key assumption of the simulation is that the immigration would not change the full-
employment or ‘natural’ unemployment rate or ‘Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of
Unemployment’ (NAIRU), which is a key exogenous variable in the FOCUS model. This
is, of course, not very plausible as recent cohorts of immigrants have had unemployment
rates up to twice as high as non-immigrants. It also has an important impact on the results
as employment in macroeconomic models like FOCUS have a tendency to gravitate
towards the levels consistent with the assumed natural rate. In effect, they have assumed
that all the new immigrants will experience the same levels of unemployment as everyone
else, which has obviously not been the case as shown in the Census and Labour Force
Survey data.
They also “turn off” a cyclical variable measured as the difference between the actual
unemployment rate and the NAIRU which function in the consumption and housing
demand equations of FOCUS proxy for the perceived cyclical state of the economy
(pp.14-15). This means that they don’t take into account any negative impact of initial
unemployment of immigrants on their spending on consumer goods or housing. Again
this biases their impact estimates in a positive direction.
On p.19, the authors note the increase in non-residential investment and investment in
machinery and equipment resulting from the shock. They attribute this to “the overall
growth in the economy and by a positive impact on corporate profits, which tend to
expand in advance of the overall economy.” On the other hand, they never acknowledge
that it is possible that lower wages resulting from increased immigration could result in a
substitution of labour for capital and reduce investment.
As to the fiscal impact of immigration, they assume that the increases in income or
spending resulting from immigration will result in increases in government revenue in the
same way as any increase in income or spending and do not take into account the
progressivity of the personal income tax which levies tax at lower rates on lower income
taxpayers like most immigrants. This is the main reason that the Census data in Herb’s
and my study show that recent immigrants only pay 57 per cent of the income taxes paid
by all Canadians.
And on the spending side, they assume that “real current and capital spending by level of
government will change in proportion to the increase in overall population due to
increased immigration with the proportions being 0.5 for federal, and 0.75 for provincial
and local governments.” (p.15) This means that they assume government spending goes
up significantly less percentage-wise than the increase in the population or that there are
economies of scale in the production of government goods and services. It is hard to
square this assumption with the fact that larger countries don’t necessarily have lower
relative levels of government spending and that government spending doesn’t decrease as
countries grow larger.
6The study examined all the main transfer payments. The most important assumptions
were that the new immigrants would get no OAS and GIS and C/QPP because none of
them would have been in the country for over ten years. No special adjustments were
made to increase Social Assistance Payments that might go to new immigrants who find
themselves with low income and no jobs. But there was no need for this as it was
assumed that they would find jobs.
Concerning OAS and GIS, there are future liabilities accruing with respect to the new
immigrants that will need to eventually to be paid. And the C/QPP program is a
contributory pension scheme. Under a life cycle approach to fiscal incidence, it is not
appropriate to count the benefits paid to non-immigrants just because they are older and
exclude the future benefits to new immigrants as both groups are paying for the same
pensions but are just at a different stage of their life cycles.
The approach used in this paper to estimate the net fiscal impact of immigration are not
appropriate. As Herb points out in his e-mail, this paper relies on assumptions about the
taxes immigrants pay (ie the same as other Canadians), while ours uses census data on the
immigrants' incomes and taxes paid. Our data clearly shows that the assumption about
equality is not valid.
The assumptions made in the paper ensure that there will be a positive impact on the
government fiscal balance when the FOCUS model is shocked. This results from the
combined effect of the assumptions, namely that recent immigrants in the labour force
will have the same unemployment rate, that their taxes will be the same with respect to
income and spending and that the government will spend less on real current and capital
spending on them than on other Canadians.
The discussion of immigrants’ funds and remittances on pp.15-16 is interesting. They
estimate that $1.1 billion (2009$) is brought in for each 100,000 immigrants. It is worth
noting that this is a relatively small amount or only $11,000 per immigrants. They
certainly don’t bring that much with them in the way of assets. Also the estimated
remittances of $190 million in 2022 for the total of 1 million additional immigrants
coming in over the period is small. It amounts to only $190 per immigrant.
It is appropriately assumed based on the 2006 census that new immigrants will earn less
(34 per cent for men and 27 per cent for women) than non-immigrants initially and that
this discount will decline by approximately 1 percentage point per year for men over the
ten year period. (p.17)
Also, interestingly, it is assumed that the wage differential indicates “an equivalent
productivity differential reflecting such factors as the underutilization of immigrant skills
that would otherwise make them more productive (and earn a higher wage) or the
inability to apply these greater skills, especially when they first enter, because of
language, cultural or other barriers.” This is exactly the same assumption I made in my
paper that estimated the negative impact of recent immigration on productivity.
7It is interesting that the increased immigration is estimated to cause a 2.02 per cent
depreciation of the Canadian dollar in terms of the U.S. by 2021. This means that the
price of most imported goods would be increased by this percentage. The overall GDP
deflator is estimated to only go up by .33 per cent because the Bank of Canada is
assumed to respond any increases in inflation resulting from the immigration shock by to
by raising interest rates in order to meet its 2% inflation target.
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